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Background: This article stems from a larger project which considers ways of 
improving assessments of capacity and judgements about best interests in connection 
with people with dementia admitted to acute hospitals with respect to decisions about 
place of residence.  
Aims: Our aim is to comment on how assessments of residence capacity are actually 
performed on general hospital wards compared with legal standards for the assessment 
of capacity set out in the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA). 
Method: Our findings are grounded in ethnographic ward-based observations and in-
depth interviews conducted in three hospital wards, in two hospitals (acute and 
rehabilitation), within two NHS healthcare trusts in the North of England over a period 
of nine months between 2008 and 2009. Twenty-nine patient cases were recruited to the 
study. We also draw from broader conceptions of capacity found in domestic and 
international legal, medical, ethical and social science literature.  
Results: Our findings suggest that whilst professionals profess to be familiar with broad 
legal standards governing the assessment of capacity under the MCA, these standards 
are not routinely applied in practice in general hospital settings when assessing capacity 
to decide place of residence on discharge from hospital. We discuss whether the criteria 
set out in the MCA and the guidance in its Code of Practice are sufficient when 
assessing residence capacity, given the particular ambiguities and complexities of this 
capacity. 
Conclusions: We conclude by suggesting that more specific legal standards are required 
when assessing capacity in this particular context.  
Keywords: Capacity assessment, best interests, Mental Capacity Act 2005, dementia, 
hospital discharge, residence 
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 1. Introduction 
 
Published figures on the impact of dementia in the UK make for sobering reading. It is 
estimated that 820,000 people in the UK currently have dementia with numbers 
projected to rise to over a million people by 2021 (Alzheimer’s Research Trust, 2010). 
Dementia results in a progressive decline in multiple areas of functioning, including 
memory, reasoning and communication skills, as well as physical skills needed to carry 
out daily activities (Hughes, 2011). Recent estimates suggest that around 25 million or 
40% of people in the UK have a close family member or friend with a diagnosis of 
dementia (Alzheimer’s Research Trust/YouGov, 2008). The cost to the UK economy 
has been estimated to be between £17 and £23 billion a year (Department of Health, 
2009; Alzheimer’s Research Trust, 2010). 
 
The rising prevalence of dementia in the UK has had a significant impact on general 
hospital admissions. Studies suggest that in the population of older people in general 
hospitals the prevalence of dementia is between 13% and 26% (Raveh et al., 2005; 
Inouye et al., 2006). A recent policy guidance document reports that 40% of people in 
general hospitals in the UK have dementia (Department of Health, 2010). Older patients 
with dementia are more likely to require treatment in a general hospital for co-morbid 
health issues and are at a greater risk of requiring treatment for injurious falls, 
dehydration, malnutrition and infection than elderly patients without the diagnosis 
(Natawala et al., 2008; Van Doorn et al., 2003). For many dementia patients, a general 
hospital admission can be a ‘determining event’ that hastens the transition from home 
into residential care (Brindle and Holmes, 2005). In a longitudinal survey of publicly 
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funded admissions carried out in the UK in 1995 and 1996, Bebbington et al. found that 
52% of admissions to care homes came from hospitals (Bebbington et al., 2001). 
McCusker et al. (2001) showed that around 30% of patients over 65 years were admitted 
to long-term care in the 12 months following a medical admission. Reinforcing the 
recommendations of the National Dementia Strategy (Department of Health, 2009), 
improving effective hospital discharge for older people with dementia is highlighted as a 
priority in the delivery of quality care (NHS Confederation, 2010).  
 
A significant number of older patients will be admitted to a general hospital from the 
community where they have been living independently or with community support. At 
the point of discharge they often express a desire to return home (Unsworth, 1996; 
Mackenzie et al., 2008) even though their concept of ‘home’ may relate to a time in the 
past, without the dangers they have encountered in more recent times (Sikdar, 2006). 
Alternatively, health and social care professionals, along with relatives, may express 
concerns that home no longer represents the most suitable environment for the person’s 
future wellbeing, with discharge into long-term residential care proposed as the ‘safer’ 
and more appropriate discharge option. Where such disagreements arise, this may 
trigger a formal assessment of the patient’s capacity (Stewart et al., 2005). This is 
especially the case when, simply on account of the diagnosis of dementia, the person’s 
decision-making capacity is called into question, despite the requirement in the Mental 
Capacity Act 2005 that there should be a presumption in favour of the person having 
capacity. The outcomes of such assessments are of profound importance, both legally 
and ethically, as they determine whether individuals have legal capacity and can 
therefore exercise personal autonomy and have their wishes upheld, or whether they lack 
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capacity and can be subjected, without consent and on the protective conditions 
prescribed by law, to the will of others.  
 
Over the past 40 years a number of valuable empirical research studies have been 
conducted internationally and in the UK, which have attempted to conceptualize the 
notion of capacity and its assessment (Roth et al., 1977; Weisstub, 1990; Appelbaum 
and Grisso, 1988; Appelbaum and Grisso, 1995; Wong et al., 1999; Wong et al., 2000). 
These studies, which have largely focused on capacity in relation to decisions about 
medical treatment and participation in research trials, have done much to inform and 
shape contemporary models of incapacity law and clinical practice worldwide. During 
this period in the UK important demographic and social changes, coupled with crucial 
mental health and capacity law reform, have led to an increased interest in capacity and 
its assessment generally (Suto et al., 2005). In England and Wales, the Mental Capacity 
Act 2005 (MCA) sets out broad legal standards against which mental capacity is now 
measured. Following its enactment, concerns surrounding older people and whether they 
are being deprived of their liberty in hospitals and care homes and should be made 
subject to Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards under the MCA (Ministry of Justice, 2008; 
Department of Health, 2007) have meant that assessments of capacity in relation, in 
particular, to deciding questions of residence should now receive closer scrutiny than 
ever before.  
 
To date, little research has been conducted on how current legal standards are applied in 
clinical practice when assessing the capacity of older patients and whether they are 
capable of deciding where to live on discharge from hospital (Shah et al., 2009a, Shah et 
al., 2009b, Mujic et al., 2009). Similarly, little judicial guidance is available through 
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decided case law on how capacity should be determined in this specific context.1 This is 
surprising given that discharge decisions relating to place of residence can present 
difficult practical and ethical dilemmas for clinical teams (Brindle and Holmes, 2005) 
and form some of the most common mental capacity issues for older people at the point 
of discharge from hospital (Mujic et al., 2009). As such, the way we assess a person’s 
capacity to decide issues of residence on discharge from hospital is an increasingly 
important matter which clearly demands more attention. 
 
The aim of this article, therefore, is to comment on how assessments of residence 
capacity are actually performed on general hospital wards in England and Wales, and to 
consider how such assessments compare with broad legal standards for assessing 
capacity set down in the MCA. Our findings are drawn from observations of capacity 
assessments carried out on three general hospital wards in the North East of England and 
form part of a larger research project which aims to improve the assessment of capacity 
and best interests for dementia patients on discharge from hospital when making 
decisions about going home or going into long-term residential care. Our comments here 
are grounded in ethnographic research involving ward-based observations, formal 
qualitative interviews, informal conversations and documentary analysis of medical and 
other ward-based records. Anonymisation and pseudonyms have been used to protect the 
confidentiality of all participants. We also draw from broader conceptions of capacity 
found in domestic and international legal, medical, ethical and social science literature. 
Future publications will highlight other areas of interest and data that emerged during 
1
 Since this article went to print, judgment in the case of KK v STCC [2012] EWHC 2136 (COP) (26 July 
2012) has been handed down by Mr Justice Baker  which provides important guidance on how the courts 




                                                        
this study, whereas the focus of this paper is on the legal issues that surround the 
assessment of the particular capacity to make decisions about place of residence. 
 
We begin by outlining the current statutory framework for assessing decision-making 
capacity under the MCA. We then consider the ‘functional’ approach to capacity 
assessment adopted by the legislature in England and Wales and how this approach 
operates within the specific confines of the MCA. We then set out to identify, through 
analysis of research data, the extent to which current legal standards are being employed 
in general hospital wards when capacity assessments are made to determine placement 
or residence capacity of patients with dementia when they are discharged from hospital. 
We show that a more comprehensive, contextual approach to the assessment of capacity 
is needed in relation to decisions about place of residence for such patients owing 
primarily to the ambiguities and complexities involved in and highlighted by this 
particular capacity. In particular, identifying the relevant information that patients must 
understand in order to demonstrate decisional capacity is especially challenging for 
professionals (Wong et al., 1999). Our findings suggest that there is currently a wide 
inconsistency of approach amongst professionals when identifying ‘information relevant 
to the decision’ (section 3(1)(a) MCA) during the assessment of residence capacity. 
Given that ‘the more information that the person must understand, and the more 
complex the nature of that information, the more impact it will have on the individual’s 
capacity to understand’ (Wong et al., 1999), we suggest that this particular aspect needs 
to be more carefully prescribed in this specific context. We therefore conclude by 
suggesting four key pieces of information that those falling within the confines of the 
MCA must understand, retain and weigh in the balance (as well as communicate) in 
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order to demonstrate decisional capacity in relation to choice of residence following 
discharge from hospital. 
 
2. The Legal Position 
 
Routine assessments of patients’ capacity to decide place of residence on discharge from 
general hospital are carried out by members of the multidisciplinary team (MDT) of 
social and health care professionals. It is rare for the courts to get involved in these 
decisions, even when the rationality of the patient’s decision to return home is called 
into question and capacity becomes a ‘live issue’ (Brazier, 2007). Nonetheless, it is 
important to bear in mind that capacity is a legal concept and the courts are the ultimate 
arbiters of any disputes concerning its assessment. This must be the case, as capacity 
decisions can potentially deprive people of their human rights and liberties and so such 
determinations must comply with legal (and ethical) standards and be justifiable in law 
(BMA/Law Society, 1996). 
In the jurisdiction of England and Wales, the MCA and its accompanying Code of 
Practice (Department of Constitutional Affairs, 2007) establishes a broad statutory 
framework through which decisions are made on behalf of adults who lack relevant 
decision-making capacity. Embedded within this framework, at sections 2 and 3 of the 
Act, is a statutory definition and test for assessing capacity for the purposes of the Act.  
 
A person lacks decision-making capacity in relation to a matter if at the material time he 
or she has ‘an impairment or disturbance in the functioning of the mind or brain’ (s2 
MCA) which renders him unable to: (1) understand information relevant to the specific 
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decision being made; (2) retain that information for as long as is required to make the 
decision; (3) use or weigh that information as part of the process of making the decision; 
or (4) communicate the decision made (s3 MCA). Where one or more of these four key 
abilities is absent, decisions can be made on behalf of the person if there is a reasonable 
belief on the part of the decision maker that capacity is lacking and what is being 
proposed is in the incapable adult’s best interests. 
 
The MCA adopts a ‘functional’ approach to capacity assessment, aligning itself with the 
approach recommended by the Law Commission when it reviewed the adequacy of the 
laws in England and Wales affecting mentally incapacitated adults in the early 1990s 
(Law Commission, 1995). The Law Commission considered three broad approaches to 
capacity assessment: the ‘functional’, the ‘outcome’ and the ‘status’ approach. Although 
of the three approaches recognised, the functional approach was and remains the most 
difficult to implement, nevertheless it has received the most informed empirical, clinical 
and legal support to date (Suto et al., 2005).  
 
The functional approach asks whether the person being assessed has demonstrated that 
he or she can weigh up any foreseeable risks and benefits associated with the decision in 
order to arrive at a choice. The Law Commission described this as whether someone can 
understand the ‘nature and effects’ of relevant information (Law Commission, 1995). 
Relevant information is defined under the MCA as ‘information about the reasonably 
foreseeable consequences of deciding one way or another, or failing to make the 
decision’ (s3(4) MCA). As such, it is the process of how the patient arrives at the 
decision and the extent to which the person’s decision-making skills and abilities meet 
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the demands of the situation (Grisso, 2003), rather than whether the decision is rational 
or sensible, that is the focus of the question.  
 
The functional capacity test under the MCA operates subject to the assumption that an 
adult is presumed to have legal capacity to make personal decisions – including 
decisions about where to live and with whom – until proven otherwise (s1(1) MCA; 
Appelbaum and Roth, 1981). For a number of elderly patients with cognitive and/or 
emotional impairments, a diagnosis of dementia may be enough to call this presumption 
into question. However, capacity cannot be established ‘merely by reference to a 
person’s age, condition, or aspect of his behaviour, which might lead others to make 
unjustified assumptions about his capacity’ (s 2(3) MCA). So people with organic or 
psychiatric illnesses will not automatically be presumed incapable without further 
investigation into their understanding and cognitive abilities. This is a rejection of the 
status approach to capacity assessment, which would render a person incapable solely on 
account of his or her membership of a group or population with one or more particular 
characteristics (Suto et al., 2005). Such an approach has garnered little support in 
empirical research studies as it imperfectly assumes all populations (e.g. all people with 
dementia) are homogeneous and all decision making equally demanding (Suto et al., 
2002). The status approach has also been firmly rejected in law as being ‘out of tune 
with the policy aim of enabling and encouraging people to take for themselves any 
decision which they have capacity to take’ (Law Commission, 1995) and contrary to 
human rights principles; a position which is now reflected in the statutory wording of the 
MCA at section 2(3) mentioned above. 
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With the functional test, a number of important legal principles need to be emphasised. 
First, the capacity assessment process under the MCA is time- and decision-specific. 
Although the MCA recognises that a person’s decision-making capacity can be 
permanent or temporary and may fluctuate, even over a short period of time, legal 
capacity is assessed at a particular point in time in relation to a specific matter. It may be 
that an assessment should be delayed if it is thought that capacity would return and this 
would accord with the person’s best interests (s 4(3) MCA). Lawyers tend to refer to 
people as having ‘lucid intervals’ in which they may be able to demonstrate sufficient 
functional capacity for their decisions to become legally binding. If a person is incapable 
of making a particular decision at a material time, this does not mean he or she lacks 
capacity generally in relation to all matters; she simply lacks capacity in relation to the 
specific task in question (Re T [1992] 4 All E.R. 649). Accordingly, the law accepts that 
capacity is a quality which has a tendency to ebb and flow, but for legal purposes its 
assessment must be taken at a snapshot in time, in relation to a specific matter and is 
decided on an all-or-nothing basis (Buchanan, 2004). 
Second, according to common law principles, capacity must be assessed in relation to 
the gravity of the decision being made (Re T). This does not mean that where decisions 
give rise to more serious consequences there will be a change in the test for capacity; but 
rather that a greater demand will be placed on a person’s abilities in relation to the 
particular decision when the outcomes are particularly grave or risky (Wong et al., 
1999). Once this principle is added to the first, i.e. that capacity is time- and decision-
specific, it becomes clear that the particular information required to make the decision is 
vital. 
It is important to note, too, that a person’s ambivalence or evasiveness about questions 
of residence post-discharge does not necessary lead to a finding of incapacity. Lady 
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Butler-Sloss in Re B (Consent to Treatment: Capacity), Re [2002] 1 F.L.R. 1090, at 
para. 35 stated that ambivalence about whether to receive medical treatment would only 
be relevant to the issue of capacity, ‘if, and only if, the ambivalence genuinely strikes at 
the root of the mental capacity of the patient’. 
Further, unwise decisions do not, by themselves, lead to a finding of incapacity. It is 
irrelevant that the decision is considered unwise in the eyes of the majority, as long as it 
is broadly consistent with the individual’s own value system. This is made explicit at 
s1(4) of the MCA: “A person is not to be treated as unable to make a decision merely 
because he makes an unwise decision.” The MCA therefore rejects the ‘outcome 
approach’ to capacity assessment which focuses on the final decision made and renders 
a person incapable on the basis that any decided outcome is inconsistent with either 
conventional values, or is one with which the assessor disagrees (Wong et al., 1999).  
Again, in the case of B, Lady Butler-Sloss highlighted the importance of not conflating 
the concepts of capacity with best interests in the context of deciding whether a person 
has sufficient capacity to decline medical treatment. She said at para. 100:  
“it is most important that those considering the issue [of whether a person has 
sufficient mental capacity] should not confuse the question of mental capacity 
with the nature of the decision made by the patient, however grave the 
consequences. Doctors must not allow their emotional reaction to or strong 
disagreement with the decision of the patient to cloud their judgment in 
answering the primary question whether the patient has the mental capacity to 
make the decision.”  
Finally, existing common law tests of testamentary capacity (Banks v Goodfellow 
(1869-70) L.R. 5), capacity to gift, (Re Beaney (deceased) [1978] 2 All E.R. 595), 
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marry, (Sheffield City Council v E & S [2005] 1 F.L.R. 965), to litigate, (Masterman-
Lister v Brutton & Co and Jewell & Home Counties Dairies [2003] 3 All E.R.) etc., 
which have developed more specific, contextual legal standards in the courts, are not 
replaced by the MCA. Instead, when the courts interpret such cases in the future they are 
given wide discretion to adopt the MCA test ‘as they think fit’ in these contexts (MCA, 
Code of Practice, para. 4.33), allowing the various elements of what a person needs to 
understand and weigh in relation to each specific test to survive the more standardised 
requirements of the MCA. It is important to highlight the existence of these specific 
common law capacity tests since we shall argue that similar, more specific standards 




3.1 Epistemological perspective 
 
The perspective of constructionism underpinned our study design and methods. 
Constructionism suggests that each individual constructs his or her own perception of 
reality and that researchers subjectively reinterpret the accounts of study participants 
(Gergen & Davis, 1985; Schwandt, 2000). 
 
3.2 Study design 
 
Ethnographic research methods were chosen to complement the exploratory nature of 
the research and to provide detailed and rich description of concrete events and 
interactions (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995). Ethnography has its roots in 
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anthropology and the study of cultural interactions within small groups and societies. 
This is an approach with an established tradition in medicine to explore the cultures of 
those delivering and the recipients of medical care (Pope, 2005). Institutional 
ethnography allows the study of strategic issues and problems in institutions, such as 
hospitals, and the practical implementation of key legislation at ward level (ten Have, 
2004). The provisions of the MCA had been disseminated within hospitals for seven 
months prior to the start of the research. Ethnographic observation and qualitative 
interviews sought an in-depth understanding of how decisions about capacity and 
judgements about best interests were arrived at in connection with whether or not a 
patient should be discharged either home or to long-term care. 
 
3.3 Ethical issues 
 
Ethical approval was gained from the NHS regional ethics committee (Newcastle and 
North Tyneside 2 Research Ethics Committee Ref No: 08/H0907/50). In line with the 
MCA, where it was deemed that a patient lacked capacity to consent, a personal or 
nominated consultee was approached to seek a view concerning the person’s 
participation in the research (MCA s32 subss. (2) and (3)). People who lack capacity are 
often excluded from research, but we considered the views and experiences of this often 
unrepresented group as critical in terms of addressing the research question and 
maintaining a person-centred approach (Kitwood, 1995). We also operated a process of 
continuous consent (Woods & Pratt, 2005) in order to ensure that patients with 
borderline capacity to consent to participate in research were included in the study 
whenever possible. All staff consented to be observed, and where selected, to participate 
in qualitative interviews. To maintain confidentiality, all transcripts of fieldwork notes, 
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observations and interviews were anonymised. Only the key researcher (MP) can 
identify individual participants. 
 
3.4 Ethnographic fieldwork 
 
Fieldwork was conducted over nine months between June 2008 and June 2009 
(incorporating a three-month analysis period after 6 months). Data collection (by MP) 
took place over 111 days supervised by JB. 
 
3.4.1 Study population and participant sampling strategy  
 
Three care of the elderly wards (acute and rehabilitation) in two hospitals within two 
NHS healthcare trusts in the North of England were selected to reflect differences in 
ward case mix and organisational culture. Since we proposed a comparative case study 
analysis we used a purposive sampling strategy that involved developing a variable 
sampling matrix in order to ensure a diverse range of participants (Strauss & Corbin, 
1998). Unlike random sampling in quantitative research, a purposive sampling strategy 
does not seek statistical representativeness of the sample selected. Rather, cases are 
selected in order to highlight the generalisability of cases to theoretical propositions. The 
process of purposive case selection identified similar cases in each participating ward on 
the basis of mental capacity. Using ward records and informal conversations with 
members of ward staff the key researcher identified patients who appeared to have 
mental capacity to make decisions about their discharge, patients who appeared to lack 
capacity and some for whom it was unclear about their capacity to make discharge 
decisions. Within each of these three groups, cases were selected to illustrate different 
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medical reasons for admission, living arrangements, previous use of formal homecare 
services and levels of social support. Analysis and case selection went hand in hand in 
order to ensure that each cell of the sampling matrix was populated with at least one 
case. Case identification ceased in each ward once data saturation was achieved and no 
new and different cases were identified.  
 
3.4.2 Fieldwork observations 
 
To understand what influenced capacity and best interest decisions, detailed field notes 
captured key ward-based interactions and events involving the whole range of health and 
social care professionals, people with dementia and their families. These included 
routine activities such as consultant-led ward rounds, MDT meetings, case conferences 
and discharge planning meetings, as well as more informal interactions. Patients’ 




Qualitative interviews were conducted with patients (N=29), a nominated family 
member (N=28), and a broad range of healthcare professionals, including both senior 
and junior doctors (physicians and psychiatrists), nursing staff (qualified and non-
qualified, senior and junior, including a psychiatric liaison nurse), occupational 
therapists, social workers, a physiotherapist and an Independent Mental Capacity 
Advocate (IMCA) (N=35). Interviews with patients and family members occurred 
around the time of discharge and, where possible, three months after discharge. The 
purpose of these interviews was to access personal experiences, thoughts, understanding 
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and values. In addition interviews with professionals specifically explored participants’ 
understanding and knowledge of the MCA and how capacity and best interests were 
usually assessed up to the point of discharge. All interviews were used by the researcher 
as an opportunity to clarify and ‘validate’ emerging themes in her observations and 
interpretations. All interviews were digitally recorded, transcribed verbatim and checked 
prior to analysis.  
 
3.6 Focus groups 
 
To supplement the hospital-based fieldwork and access a broader range of perspectives 
and experiences, a series of focus groups were held in the period between April and May 
2009 with three groups of healthcare professionals (N=22) and one group of three carers 
with two staff members from the voluntary agency which supported them. In addition to 
hospital specialists, the professional focus groups included general practitioners 
(including a trainee) plus social workers, occupational therapists, nurses (including an 
assessor for nursing home placement), psychologists, a care home manager and a 
chaplain with expertise in the field of dementia care. The focus groups were asked to 
consider three hypothetical cases derived from the observation data and to discuss how 
capacity and decisions about best interests might be improved. The groups were 
facilitated by two members of the research team, one leading and the other taking 
observational notes (JB, JCH, HG, MP). Discussions were digitally recorded, 





From transcripts of fieldwork notes, interviews, focus groups and memos the key 
researcher synthesised the decision-making process for each case. These ‘case studies’ 
facilitated case comparisons using the constant comparative method (Glaser & Strauss, 
1967). Memos, which focused on individual emergent themes or concepts, were written 
in order to explore and develop the data (Charmaz, 2006). Transcripts of the primary 
data and ‘case studies’ comprised the ‘data’ for analysis in data workshops (MP, JB, 
JCH) where key themes were identified and a coding frame developed. NVivo software 




Analysis of the 29 cases revealed a number of important issues relating to how 
assessments of capacity to decide residence were being carried out in practice compared 
with current legal standards under the MCA. Our key findings below have been grouped 
under headings which reflect three main themes emerging from our data, namely: 
whether a functional approach to capacity assessment was routinely adopted by 
professionals; whether such assessments were being carried out in a formal or informal 
way on general hospital wards; and whether the information given to patients by 
professionals during the assessment process (being information that the patient was 
required to understand and weigh in order to communicate a decision) was ‘relevant’ 
information in the context of this particular capacity assessment. 
 
4.1 A Functional Approach to Capacity Assessment 
 
4.1.1 Functional versus outcome 
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 Although on the whole professionals seemed to appreciate that a statutory definition and 
functional test for capacity existed in the MCA, not all adopted the statutory approach in 
practice. Relevant information was not always clearly identified and varied between 
cases. It was not always clear how the information was used to test the person’s recall, 
understanding and ability to weigh matters up before communicating a decision. One 
social worker provided a clear example of how he approached a formal assessment of 
capacity to decide residence on discharge from hospital: 
 
 “Well I don’t do the MMSE2 or anything like that – that’s nursing or social workers 
from old age psychiatry – I’m more about where are you? Who are you? Tell me a wee 
bit about yourself. Tell me a little bit about your family, your past history. Do you know 
why you are here? You know, erm, what are your wishes for the future? If they’re 
married, tell me about your wife, you know, and if they’re able to give me that 
information then in the main we’re talking about someone who has capacity.” 
Interview: 02sJ-0206, lines 49-55: Social Worker  
 
The narrative derived from this social worker’s approach would yield some information 
relevant to a functional assessment of capacity (e.g. if the patient recalls and understands 
why he or she is in hospital), but other aspects of the interview would be irrelevant (e.g. 
some details – albeit not all – about the patient’s spouse and family); and there are some 
things the person (arguably) ought to know to make a capacitous decision with respect to 
2
 The mini-mental state examination (MMSE) is a much-used formal screening tool of cognitive function. 
It mainly tests memory, but also other cognitive abilities such as reading, writing and drawing. Scores 
under 24/30 may indicate dementia; but even scores of 27/30 or below may indicate a decline in cognitive 
function (Folstein et al., 1975; Hodges, 2007).  
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place of residence, such as his or her requirements (if any) for assistance which would 
not necessarily be covered. 
 
For patients with a diagnosis of dementia or cognitive impairment, where there was 
uncertainty regarding their capacity, we observed that professionals routinely made 
assessments that were outcome-driven rather than based on an assessment of mental 
function. Professionals from a range of disciplines, as shown in the following two 
quotes, explained how it could be difficult to unpick whether a patient lacked insight 
into his or her situation, and therefore could not weigh things up properly, or whether 
the patient was simply being unwise, in which case the decision should be respected.  
 
“I think this is an interesting issue around capacity, I think quite often capacity is used, 
or the issue around capacity is used, as a basis for saying that somebody’s made a 
decision that you don’t agree with yeah … [Later in the interview]…I mean the difficulty 
thing is, like I say is about the unwise decision if it’s difficult knowing sometimes 
whether somebody has been able to process the information and make a wise decision, 
make a capacitated decision or whether in fact they haven’t been able to analyse it. I 
think that’s quite difficult sometimes but if you know your patient well enough you can 
generally judge that.” 
Interview: 01BsB-0808, lines 192-194 and 351-356: Occupational Therapist (OT) 
 
“....erm then it comes down to that thing of whether it’s an unwise decision but one made 
with a full understanding of the risks, or whether it’s, you know, a decision, you know 
and completely no insight what the problems may be, what the consequences are and I 
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think that’s when you start to get very concerned about somebody’s capacity to make 
decisions.” 
Interview: 01AsO-2111, lines 66-70: Consultant  
 
 
Where assessors did not agree with patients’ decisions, they were prone to interpret the 
decision as lacking insight and, thus, the decision maker as lacking capacity. 
Furthermore, ‘best interests’ was often considered by the MDT irrespective of whether 
or not the patient had the requisite capacity. Issues surrounding ‘best interests’ and 
‘risks’ appeared to be prominent factors in the assessment of capacity in the context of 
dementia.  
 
Although we observed that professionals from both health and social care professed to 
understand the need to respect unwise decisions, putting this into practice appeared 
problematic. This seemed especially true for junior nursing staff who appeared more 
risk-averse; and also for the nursing staff who had developed a closer relationship with 
the patient on the ward and perhaps felt more accountable for the patient’s future 
welfare. Consultants, and to some extent professionals from social work and psychiatry 
liaison services, seemed to be more comfortable with the concept of the unwise decision 
and capacity. As such, how legal standards under the MCA were perceived and 
implemented in practice varied, not only between the different professional groups 
observed, but also between individuals practising within those professional groups.  
 
4.1.2 Contrasting case studies 
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These points can be highlighted by comparing two cases – ‘Mr Collier’ and ‘Mrs 
Gardiner’. As with three-quarters of the patients in our study, both patients lived alone in 
their own homes prior to admission. On discharge from hospital one returned home and 
one was discharged to residential care. Like approximately half of the patients, both 
underwent a formalised capacity assessment.  Mrs Gardiner’s case was, however, unique 
amongst the 29 cases observed in that the definitive decision maker in her case was a 
social worker and not a member of the hospital’s clinical team.  
 
These cases were chosen to represent two contrasting approaches to capacity 
assessment. However, they embody many of the factors for the two-thirds of cases in 
which the patient’s capacity was unclear. Whilst these particular cases provide clear 
examples of either ‘functional’ or ‘outcome-driven’ assessments, in many of our cases 
there was ambivalence about the patient’s mental capacity in relation to hospital 
discharge.  
 
4.1.2.1 Mr Collier 
 
In the case of Mr. Collier, there were grave concerns about his safety at home, where he 
lived alone. The home was untidy. He smoked in bed and his diet was poor. Many of the 
healthcare professionals involved in his care found it difficult to engage with him, which 
made it difficult for them to assess his capacity. Ultimately, the lack of engagement was 
taken to signify a lack of capacity (although not everyone in the team agreed with this) 
and, despite the patient continuing to express a wish to return home, reluctantly he 
accepted a trial placement in residential care. At follow-up he expressed unhappiness 
because he felt ‘tricked’ by the social worker and doctors into accepting a trial 
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discharge; but there had been no review or sign of any attempts to get him home. One 
aspect of this case, therefore, is that it shows the importance of the decisions being made 
given the risk of an ensuing deprivation of liberty. But it also signals the reluctance of 
staff to accept the implications of a functional assessment, as shown by this quote from 
an OT involved in Mr. Collier’s care. 
 
‘I don’t think they’ve done a formal capacity assessment with him yet [right]. His 
MMSE was something like 28 out of 30, or 30 out of 30 ….He can relay the information 
back and he would, technically – which is why I have a bit of an issue with the whole 
capacity thing. I mean I understand that, I get that you have to have measures in place 
so that people can, you know, if they have capacity they make that choice, and I 
understand that people have different, you know, what I class as ‘tidy’ might not be what 
somebody else classes as ‘tidy’ or whatever, but there must be like a cut-off point where 
he just clearly isn’t coping at home.’  
Interview: 02sC-1305, lines 262-274: Occupational Therapist (OT) 
 
This is a clear demonstration of the thought that outcomes (e.g. Mr. Collier living at 
home in a very untidy state) should determine decisions about where Mr. Collier should 
live rather than a functional assessment of his decision-making capacity. In addition, 
there appeared to be tensions between preserving the rights of the individual, and 
protecting wider society (Larkin et al., 2009). For example, at the MDT meeting, when 
discussing Mr Collier’s behaviour of smoking in bed, the team talked about the risks to 
the patient, but also to neighbours if the house were to burn down. Hence, the concepts 
of risk and risk management play an important role in the assessment process vis-à-vis 
placement. This approach resonated with the majority of cases that we observed. 
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 Indeed, several healthcare professionals, as recorded in the fieldnotes extract below, 
expressed the opinion that the issue of capacity was almost secondary to the issue of the 
discharge outcome – in this case safety – when it came to discharge planning.  
 
‘…after we finished recording[the interview] she [Psychiatry Liaison Nurse] said that 
her main point was that it’s not really – her “motto” as she put it – was does it matter if 
the patient has capacity? Really the issue is, is the patient going where they want to go 
and is everyone happy with it? If that’s the case then does it really matter if that patient 
has capacity?’  
Fieldnotes: 2-35-0106, lines 216-220.  
 
4.1.2.2 Mrs. Gardiner 
 
The case of Mrs Gardiner, on the other hand, is a good example of where a functional 
approach to the assessment of the patient’s capacity was carried out. Although the 
patient’s decision to return home was considered unwise by the MDT the patient was, 
nevertheless, found to be capable of making the decision. This assessment was 
encouraged by a pilot proforma being used on the ward to assist capacity assessments, 
which closely reflected the criteria of the MCA. The result was that descriptions of the 
formal assessment were lengthy, well documented and closely followed the statutory 
requirements of the MCA. In the quote that follows from a doctor involved in Mrs. 
Gardiner’s care, it is acknowledged that there were doubts about the wisdom of the 
outcome, but the functional assessment of capacity won the day. 
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‘Yeah she was deemed to have capacity and she ended up going home although there’s 
quite a lot of concerns from the nursing staff about how she would manage at home. As 
far as I know she hasn’t come back in again (laughs) erm, erm, but, I think, you know, 
this, that’s the difficulty if you do deem someone that does have capacity erm it’s, that 
you do have to be able to let them make unwise decisions or decisions that may well not 
be erm sort of what you think is the most sensible decision if they are able to make the 
capacity about going home…. [later in interview]…So yeah I’m not sure whether there 
was doubts about her capacity as such but just whether home was the best, best, best 
place for her.’  
Interview: 02AsA-0104, lines 125-131 and 152-154: Registrar 
 
4.2 Formal and Informal Capacity Assessments 
 
Professionals were observed to adopt informal and formal processes of capacity 
assessment in practice. These appeared not always to be two separate processes, but 
could be concurrent or interchangeable. Professionals described informal assessments of 
capacity as processes that occurred over a period of time and involved gleaning 
information from various sources, which then fed into the overall capacity assessment. 
This was often referred to as having a ‘holistic view’ of the patient. It might involve, for 
instance, an OT home visit, the result of which would be fed into the assessment process 
to form a general picture of the patient’s capacity. It should be noted that such a visit 
might either be used to inform judgements about the patient’s functional ability to weigh 
things up, or it might encourage an outcomes approach to the assessment of capacity: if 
the home visit went badly, but the patient still said he or she wished to go home, it might 
be presumed that this was in itself a marker of incapacity.  
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 Analysis of the 29 patient cases revealed that informal assessments were routinely 
carried out during ward rounds. Patients were often assessed numerous times, 
informally, over a prolonged period of time before the decision about their capacity 
became ‘formalised’. Formal assessments involved conversational exchanges between 
the patient and the assessor with questions about home-life, reasons for the current 
admission, the patient’s feelings and their expectations concerning the future. 
Judgements were then made as to whether the patient had given responses that seemed 
reasonable. Such assessments were still heavily influenced by the more informal, 
general observations of the MDT, which had been gathered over a prolonged period of 
time. The following extract illustrates this approach: 
 
‘You get a feeling about people’s general capacity, but then ... if a decision is being 
taken or being made or about to be taken, I think then we’ll be slightly more specific 
about going to the patient and actually exploring the issues in more depth. So I think 
there’s a gut feeling and then sort of you know hopefully, I think it mainly comes about if 
there’s conflict or if there’s concerns that we investigate that further by sort of direct 
questioning.”  
Interview: 01AsO-2111, lines 24-31: Consultant 
 
Capacity assessments were not always, therefore, routinely carried out, especially when 
patients failed to voice their opinions and instead complied with what was being 
suggested. Evidence from the medical records of our cases suggests that formal 
assessments were only completed for approximately half of the 29 patients. The reliance 
on informal processes can again raise the concern that the functional nature of capacity 
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assessments is not being grasped by those working on the front line. And there is 
evidence that more formal assessments only occur when there is disagreement.  
 
‘But I don’t feel that it happens in real life really. I don’t, I think if the MDT and the 
patient’s relatives decide that they should, that their level of requirement is that they 
might need care, I don’t feel that we do assess their capacity if they just kind of, if 
patients are placid as you call it, if there’s no big objection if they’re not saying loudly 
‘I want to go home’ then I don’t feel that on a routine basis that we assess their capacity 
to agree with us, we only assess their capacity if they don’t.’  
Healthcare professional focus group 1; lines 835-840 
 
4.3 Understanding Information Relevant to the Decision 
 
The nature and extent of the information that the patient should be deemed to understand 
in order to demonstrate decisional capacity varied between cases. The inability of 
patients to recall earlier conversations with staff on the ward, or confusion around where 
they were or who the nursing staff were, would on occasions lead to patients being 
assessed as incapable of making decisions about their future choice of residence. The 
relevance of such facts to a functional assessment of capacity to decide about place of 
residence remains questionable. 
 
‘You know for some people it’s actually very straightforward: they plainly don’t have 
capacity because they can’t remember, you know, anything. They don’t know where they 
are, they think they’re at home, they think I’m their daughter, you know they think they 
still live with their mother, you know things that are plainly not true and they plainly, 
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even when we treated [the] medical problem, they plainly do not, cannot understand or 
retain relevant information about the home situation so then it’s easy to make a decision 
that they don’t have capacity and then we can make a best interests decision.’  
Interview: 01-BsQ-1212, lines 71-78: Consultant 
 
The following extract from fieldnotes suggests that professionals are not always explicit 
when presenting information to patients or exploring the potential of long-term 
institutional care.  
 
 ‘The consultant said that he had a feeling that the patient might be “up for it”, referring 
to residential care. He also said that they should be honest about it, they should say 
what it is. He didn’t say the word ‘euphemism’, but he was saying was that they would 
always say “a bit more care”, “somewhere where you can get a bit more help”. He 
said, at the end of the day, what they [the patients] were going into was an institution. I 
don’t think he was suggesting that they would say that it was an institution to the 
patient, but I think, in his words, what he was saying was that they should say “We’re 
thinking about a residential nursing home for you.” So I thought that was really 
interesting that the consultant felt that the MDT aren’t always that explicit when they’re 
exploring opinions of the patient and they do use terms like ‘somewhere where you can 
get a bit more care’ and it just may not be very clear to patients that it’s being put to 
them or suggested to them that one of those options is residential care, rather than 
returning to their original home.”  




 Decisions to return older people with dementia home, when they possess fluctuating or 
declining mental functioning, are particularly troubling for professionals. Evaluative 
decisions required in this type of capacity assessment are often complex and the 
anticipated risks unpredictable. Throughout our observations and interviews, anxious 
parties voiced concerns about potential wandering, injurious falls and fire hazards, 
eating inappropriate or out-of-date food, the inability to manage finances properly and 
exploitation by carers, relatives and strangers (Waugh, 2009). Even when an elderly 
person demonstrates the ability to understand and weigh risks, placing a vulnerable 
person back into a home environment, with uncertain and interminable risks, both to 
themselves and potentially to others, is a huge responsibility for the decision maker, 
exposing those concerned to the risk of legal liability when things go wrong. 
  
Clear tensions exist in our current legal model between the notions of autonomy and 
risk. The MCA’s aim of empowering people so that they make decisions themselves 
wherever possible in the least restrictive environment is balanced incongruously against 
the need to protect the allegedly or actually incapacitated person and others from the 
effects of risky or even negligent decisions. At the point of discharge from hospital, 
professionals are simultaneously responsible for upholding patients’ rights to make 
autonomous decisions wherever possible (under the principles of the Act) whilst 
protecting patients and others from the effects of hazardous discharge decisions (Larkin, 
2009). Our observations of clinical practice suggest that professionals struggle to 
reconcile these competing aims effectively, so that capacity assessment outcomes are 
often couched in terms of risk and prevention of harm.  
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In law, the boundary between capacity and incapacity is not static and can advance or 
retreat depending upon the gravity of the decision or the risks that the outcome of any 
decision may present to the person or others. In a treatment context, this means that 
when more serious, life-threatening or irreversible treatment decisions need to be made, 
then a patient must demonstrate a greater degree of capacity before their wishes are 
respected. In the context of capacity to decide to return home on discharge from hospital 
this would mean that a greater degree of capacity would need to be demonstrated by a 
person who wished to return home to risky home placement. The difficulty with this 
approach is that treatment decisions, even bad ones, give rise to largely predictable risks. 
Patients who refuse surgery for breast cancer will risk strongly impaired survival rates 
(Verkooijan H., et al., 2005). Doctors can predict, with varying degrees of accuracy, 
how quickly a cancer will spread and the likely symptoms that the patient may encounter 
should this happen. Often patients will be presented with a broad spectrum of potential 
risks and outcomes, the physical impact of which will most often be borne by the patient 
alone. Regardless of whether a prognosis is correct, as the potential risks are identifiable 
there is the perception that they can, therefore, be contained and managed. So even when 
a patient’s treatment refusal is morally repugnant to others, society can, at a push, deal 
with it; the law and the patient’s autonomy can be upheld because the risks are contained 
and firmly within our sights. Risky home placements, on the other hand, give rise to 
hazards that are illimitable; they are more uncertain and therefore less manageable. For 
those who make capacity assessments, it is much more difficult in this specific situation 
not to let those uncertainties influence the outcome of any assessment of capacity, 
especially when those decisions have the potential to harm third parties.  
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It has been argued that the law creates too sharp a boundary between those who possess 
capacity and those who do not, which fails to deal adequately with those who rest at the 
margin of decisional capacity (Herring, 2009). It is at the margins where the difficult 
assessments lie and where evidence suggests that capacity assessments can be 
subjective, idiosyncratic procedures where the outcomes are often unpredictable and 
inconsistent. As Kapp notes ‘the various parties generally “bumble through”, extra 
legally as best they can. They do this based on informal, working clinical judgments 
about capacity and the cooperation (or complicity, depending on one’s attitude to the 
propriety of “bumbling through”) of willing and available family members, friends, and 
health care and social care providers.’ (Kapp, 2002). Yet the legitimacy of our current 
legal model relies heavily on health and social care professionals making accurate and 
reliable ‘neat, clean, dyadic (either/or) distinctions between decisional capacity and 
incapacity’ (Kapp, 2002). In reality capacity is rarely seen in such black and white terms 
and operates at the margins in varying shades of grey.  
 
Our observations of clinical practice (albeit on only a few wards in one part of the UK) 
reflect this analysis. Informal assessments of a patient’s capacity, based on a collection 
of subjective judgements, are routinely made by the MDT or by relatives, often over 
extended periods of time. During this process legal standards are not always applied, or 
are applied selectively, in order to arrive at a solution or outcome that is considered 
‘best’ for the patient. This raises the question whether current legal standards are 
sufficiently robust to evaluate this particular capacity effectively or whether the 
assessment of a person’s capacity to make decisions about whether to return home from 
hospital requires more specific legal standards, greater interventions and safeguards. We 
suggest they do. Although limited safeguards exist under the MCA when local 
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authorities and NHS trusts are making decisions about a change of accommodation for a 
patient who lacks capacity, in that they are now required to appoint an independent 
mental capacity advocate (IMCA) to represent that individual if there are no family or 
friends to support them, no independent safeguards exist when family members are 
present. Older people with a diagnosis of dementia are in a particularly vulnerable 
position, especially at the tail end of life when it is easy for their voices not to be heard. 
To restrict (or even deprive) older people of their liberty by deciding that they should 
spend the rest of their lives in institutional care, against their wishes, potentially violates 
one of the most fundamental human rights – that of personal liberty – and is a decision 
which calls for robust legal standards and close clinical scrutiny (O’Keefe, 2009). 
 
Since the MCA came into force in 2007, a programme of mandatory training for local 
authorities and NHS Trusts has been rolled out across England and Wales. Early studies 
suggested that some NHS trusts may have been slow to implement training policies. In 
2009, a small pilot study conducted by Shah et al. found that fewer than 50% of the 
consultant old age psychiatrists surveyed reported that the MCA training in their trusts 
was mandatory (Shah et al., 2009a). Whilst this figure represents an early snapshot of 
training in one sector of the NHS, and may not represent current trends, more recent 
studies have begun to focus on the efficacy of such training amongst NHS and social 
care staff generally and whether it produces any discernible benefit to participants. In 
2011, Willner et al. conducted a study that aimed to assess the extent of knowledge of 
the MCA amongst new recruits to a NHS Trust by means of a true/false questionnaire 
(Willner, 2011). Their findings revealed no significant differences in performance 
between staff who reported having previously received training on the MCA and those 
who had not, giving rise to concerns about how much information is being retained by 
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participants in MCA training. There are also problems meeting the specific training 
requirements of such a diverse group of health and social care professionals and IMCAs 
who are required to understand key provisions of the MCA in their respective roles 
(Jones, 2005, Cowan, 2007). Although our findings suggest that even the use of a simple 
proforma (for example in the case of Mrs Gardiner) can lead to a better understanding of 
the Act and more comprehensive record of assessment, which is more closely aligned to 
the legal standards of the MCA, few such interventions were evident in practice during 
this study. Instead, assessment practices were largely idiosyncratic in their approach and 
varied considerably between cases. Professionals were left to determine which 
information they considered material or relevant to the decision and how much 
information was to be imparted to the patient during the assessment process. This had an 
important influence on the outcome of any assessment since it tended to yield subjective 




We conclude our study, therefore, by proposing that a more specific test should be 
adopted when assessing capacity to decide where to live on discharge from hospital, 
given the inherent complexities that this particular decision presents. This would mean 
that in this specific context, what the patient is required to understand and weigh – the 
‘relevant information’ that is material to the decision – would need to be more precisely 
drawn, just as more specific legal standards are applied when assessing capacity in other 
contexts, as in testamentary capacity.  
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We propose that patients (who are in hospital) would be assessed as unable to make a 
decision about where they will live after their discharge from hospital if, in accordance 
with the MCA, they were unable to understand, retain, weigh and communicate the 
following information: 
 
• Why they have been in hospital (hence, this must have been explained to them); 
• The social arrangements that are being proposed for them on discharge, i.e. 
whether they will be returning home or moving to another place of residence and 
with whom they will be living, if anyone, (hence, these things should have been 
discussed with them); 
• The ways in which it is being suggested they will or might require help (if at all) 
after their discharge from hospital and the care options they would have 
available to them (hence, the relevant issues and options, including the 
justifiable concerns of others, must have been discussed with them); 
• Those persons and services able and willing to provide help and the nature of the 
help that can be provided (hence, this must have been discussed with them). 
 
It may be that the person has been told that they require adaptations to their home and 
twice-daily visits from homecare and it is this information that they would be required to 
understand, retain, weigh up and communicate; but they may reject that these things are 
required and still have capacity if they have demonstrated the required functional ability.  
 
The above recommendations are based on the premise that when assessing an 
individual’s capacity the amount and relevance of the information given to individuals, 
to allow them to make a decision about a proposed course of action or its alternatives, 
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will have a direct bearing on the outcome of the assessment. Assessing a person’s 
capacity to decide where to live will usually require the assessor to have a great deal of 
information concerning the patient’s past and current living arrangements, their current 
and future care needs and the person or people who may be willing to meet these needs. 
Only by gathering this information can the assessor present the various options, 
alternatives and risks associated with a particular choice of residence to a patient so that 
they can understand and weigh those factors in the balance in order to demonstrate 
decisional capacity and make an informed choice. Healthcare professionals charged with 
making such decisions must, therefore, ensure that patients with dementia are provided 
with all of the relevant facts on which they will be assessed and judged. This must be 
done in a manner that is meaningful, which conveys the underlying purpose and aim of 
the assessment process. By adopting more specific criteria as regards to what is ‘relevant 
information’, it is hoped that future discharge decisions can be made more openly, in a 
way that is more defensible in terms of both the ethical and legal frameworks within 
which care is provided. 
 
Our study has highlighted a number of practical and conceptual tensions faced by 
professionals when assessing the capacity of dementia patients to make decisions about 
where to live on discharge from hospital.  It has also drawn attention to the need to re-
examine current legal standards when assessing capacity in this context. We have 
ventured to suggest ways in which current legal standards can be enhanced. There is 
clearly also a need, however, for additional empirical study to test the effectiveness of 
our proposals and to clarify the issues raised in this article. We are aware that, at present, 
there is little or no quantitative evidence regarding the assessment of capacity to choose 
a place of residence. At best, therefore, future research might involve ‘mixed methods’, 
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to include qualitative and quantitative research in order to test the feasibility and 
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